---
title: "CVE-2026-98069: CVE-2026-98069"
description: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown() rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown. The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it. Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them (\"rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently\"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed. Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill(). The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING. Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---"
url: https://panop.io/threat-heartbeat/CVE-2026-98069/
---

# CVE-2026-98069 CVE-2026-98069

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds\_conn\_shutdown() rds\_conn\_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS\_IN\_XMIT and RDS\_RECV\_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds\_conn\_path\_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait\_event() returns, rds\_send\_xmit() can re-acquire RDS\_IN\_XMIT (or rds\_ib\_recv\_refill() can re-acquire RDS\_RECV\_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown. The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire\_in\_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds\_ib\_ring\_init()) and rds\_send\_path\_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it. Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG\_ON()s in rds\_ib\_sub\_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds\_ib\_send\_cqe\_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path \*acquire\* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed. Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds\_conn\_path\_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear\_bit\_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds\_send\_path\_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire\_in\_xmit() or acquire\_refill(). The fastpath users of these bits - rds\_send\_xmit() and rds\_ib\_recv\_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds\_tcp\_reset\_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS\_IN\_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds\_tcp\_accept\_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds\_tcp\_accept\_lock and t\_conn\_path\_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds\_tcp\_conn\_path\_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds\_ib\_conn\_path\_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds\_tcp\_reset\_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS\_CONN\_DISCONNECTING. Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush\_workqueue(rds\_wq) in rds\_tcp\_listen\_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds\_tcp\_reset\_callbacks() issues target cp\_send\_w and cp\_recv\_w on the path's ordered cp\_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp\_down\_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp\_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---

CVSS base score 8.1 /10

High

CISA KEV

Not listed

Public exploit

None known

EPSS

0.57% chance of exploitation in 30 days

[View the NVD record ↗](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98069)

## Details

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Published

25 September 2026

Updated

15 October 2026

## References

- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98069](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98069)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1fe627e5db5c3f53a9f9f9c8a66671755d306955)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7febb113795d5de5b690b208f4b0e64a5fad1201)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/813f3582ac7ae9f60f917937d54660e0952d5f2d)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e96c9749a06833801f60c393aa1d405ea226c)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f900f585cbb0fbe6aa00c31c9f5bb63ee614456)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e46248e375a516301884719f08b6015c79a6456)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32e21bcf4b5b11454bf57c4bb3bf019b71512ace)
- [https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729](https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f4f21e4439df30d9aca9fb3bac38191a2f34729)

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